Volume VI Issue III

Round Up

Quarterly Alternative Dispute Resolution Round Up (May – July 2026)

Interview

In Conversation with Prof. Dr. Kabir Duggal

Articles

Reconciling Finality and Correction: The Judicial Power to Modify Arbitral Awards After Gayatri Balaswami and The Enforceability of ‘Court-Modified’ Awards Under the New York Convention by Mr. Abhishek Rajan

Few questions in Indian arbitration law have proved as stubborn as the one the Constitution Bench resolved in Gayatri Balasamy v ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd [“Balasamy”], i.e., whether a court hearing a challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 [“1996 Act”] may modify an arbitral award, or whether its remedial choices are exhausted by annulment, affirmation and remission. Section 34 of the 1996 Act, is, by design, a provision of restraint. It permits recourse to a court ‘only by an application for setting aside’ of the award, confining the grounds of challenge to an exhaustive list, and is reinforced by Section 5 of the 1996 Act, which forbids judicial intervention save except where Part I expressly allows it.2 On a plain reading, the Section contemplates no power of modification. However, for two decades, the courts have been divided, with one line, anchored in Project Director, NHAI v M Hakeem, insisting that the deliberate omission of the 1940 Act’s modification power forecloses any such reading, and another quietly varying awards, chiefly as to interest and quantum, to avoid the injustice of an all-or-nothing remedy.

From Speed to Enforceability: Assessing the ICC 2026 Highly Expedited Arbitration Rules Within India’s Arbitration Framework by Mr. Sudeep Ranjan

International commercial arbitration operates at the intersection of party autonomy, institutional efficiency, and domestic public policy. But it has been found that cost and delay are amongst the most persistently cited drawbacks of the traditional arbitral process. Moreover, minimising cost and securing quicker outcomes remain the principal reasons parties choose an expedited procedural mechanism over traditional arbitration. This gap between the promise and the practice of efficient dispute resolution is precisely what has driven arbitral institutions to redesign their procedural rules. The International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules, 2026 [“ICC Rules”] are the latest instance of this institutional pursuit. ICC Rules have crucially introduced a third tier of arbitration, the Highly Expedited Arbitration Provisions [“HEAP”]. It is structured in such a manner that it will yield the final award within three months, which will significantly alter the traditional method. It will also prevent any procedural flexibility, multi-party joinder, and document production, and will permit the use of unreasoned awards.

Algorithmic Arbitrators and the Due Process Deficit: Reimagining Section 34 Finality in India’s AI-Assisted Arbitration Landscape by Mr. Anmol Srivastava and Ms. Divyanshi Bajpai

Artificial Intelligence [“AI”] has prompted arbitral institutions such as the London Court of International Arbitration, International Chamber of Commerce, the Singapore International Arbitration Centre, Mumbai Centre for International Arbitration [“MCIA”], and Dubai International Arbitration Centre to implement AI support systems to advance cases more quickly and reduce costs. These support systems flag precedents, synthesise evidence and generate recommendations which arbitrators routinely adopt with minimal revision. This efficiency through AI conflicts with Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which provides parties with the right to receive a reasoned award from an unbiased human decision-maker. Section 12 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 [“Arbitration Act”] requires arbitrators to maintain ‘independence, impartiality and integrity’.

 Jurisdiction versus Admissibility in Indian Arbitration: The Case for Coherent Framework by Ms. Devu V. and Ms. Ayushi Pal

One of the key developments in modern international arbitration is the distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility. Although both raise preliminary objections to the adjudication of a dispute, the two concepts have very different procedural effects. Jurisdiction raises the question of whether the arbitral tribunal has the legal authority to decide a dispute. Admissibility, on the other hand, focuses on whether a claim is appropriate for determination by an arbitral tribunal that has jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. Such matters are typically within the exclusive purview of the arbitral tribunal and are not open to judicial intervention. The distinction has become highly relevant in the context of limitation, contractually mandated pre-arbitral procedures, and tiered dispute resolution clauses.

Compilation